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Abstract. The article provides an account of the unlikely revival of the medieval 
Just War Theory, due in large part to the efforts of Michael Walzer. Its purpose is 
to address the question: What is a just war theorist? By exploring contrasts 
between scholarly activity and forms of international activism, the paper argues 
that just war theorists appear to be just war criminals, both on the count of 
aiding and abetting aggression and on the count of inciting troops to commit war 
crimes. 
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Introduction 
 
The just war theory made its unlikely comeback in large part due to Michael 
Walzer's popularizing efforts. One of its most remarkable achievements was its 
application in the form of "humanitarian intervention" to absolve the US-led NATO 
aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999. Yet on June 17, 2010 Walzer was 
decorated with an honorary doctorate from Belgrade University; the ceremony 
took place not far from the remains of buildings destroyed by NATO in the centre 
of the city. One may, then, rightly contemplate the meaning of gestures of this 
sort: What could tempt people, particularly the intellectual elites, to even 
consider honoring those who advocated aggression against their country? Why 
honor someone hailing from a hegemonic power in a weak state that had 
witnessed and directly felt the fury of that power, which left behind thousands 
dead and the whole country in physical, psychological, and economic devastation? 
These are complicated questions to answer,
i but in this paper I shall consider a 
more basic issue: What is a just war theorist? However, let us first consider a bit 
of history. 
 
A Brief History of the Just War Doctrine 
The doctrine of just war theory has a long history and its invocations have gone 
through a series of shifting context of applications. Initially developed in the context Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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of Catholic theology, the theory was also taken to have moral implications, thus 
transitioning into the secular domain, which at least by the 19
th century and certainly 
by mid-20th century also accommodated a legal interpretation. This prolonged 
transition from the theological context with moral implications into a purely secular 
domain with legal interpretation (within positive international law) took up most of 
the history of the just war theory. Eventually, however, with the effort of Michael 
Walzer, the doctrine reintegrated the moral domain in political theory, and later moral 
philosophy. Taken as a contemporary legal theory it consists of two components: the 
jus ad bellum is that part of international law governing resort to international armed 
conflicts. The jus in bello is the law of war properly so formulated, namely, the body 
of rules governing the conduct of parties engaged in international armed conflict. 
These are also the main constituents of this doctrine as it originated in the theological 
context and transferred to the moral domain or normative order. 
The founder of the Christian doctrine of just war is St. Augustine who gave it 
its first formulation in Contra Faustum. Therein St. Augustine asked the critical 
question: "Is it necessarily sinful for a Christian to wage war?" His negative and 
exceptive answer—that wars are just if waged to avenge injustice or to coerce the 
enemies  of  the  Church—is  generally  considered  as  the  first  appearance  of  the 
specifically Christian doctrine of just war. As he so often did, St. Thomas Aquinas, 
in  his  Summa  Theologica,  repeated  and  elaborated  St.  Augustine's  view.  The 
Thomist  formula  embodies the  medieval  and  scholastic thinking  about  the  just 
war, and it remains applicable in the doctrine of the Catholic Church to this day. 
Aquinas answered the question posed by St. Augustine in the negative, provided: 
(i) the Prince had authorized the war; (ii) there was a "just cause" against the 
adversary on account of some guilt on his part; and (iii) the belligerent had a 
"right intention," i.e., to promote good or to avoid evil. The main emphasis was 
upon the requirement of a just cause, which was considered to be a matter of 
moral theology. Thus the Thomist view made the question of the "justness" of all 
wars one that fell within the jurisdiction of the Church. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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From  1618  to  1648,  the  Thirty  Years  War  ravaged  Europe.  This  period  of 
bitter  struggle  between  Catholicism  and  Protestantism  generated  its  own 
ideological  contribution  to  the  just  war  doctrine,  adding  a  purely  theological 
component of jus ad bellum: war for the cause of religion. The violent clashes 
were deplorably without restraints. The trouble was that the just war doctrine had 
relatively little to say about conduct in warfare (jus in bello) beyond condemning 
perfidy (breach of promises) and the slaughter of women and children because 
war against them was "unjust." The lack of restraint was compounded by 14th 
and 15th-century ideas that the victorious Prince was waging a just war and, as 
the agent of God, punishing the defeated, as the devils in hell would punish them 
in the next world. The victory was the judgment of God as to the justness of the 
cause of the victor. The war could not be considered just on both sides because 
God's  will  was  not  divisible.  These  were  the  components  that  made  up  the 
content of the classic just war doctrine of the late medieval period. 
In  the  16
th  and  first  half  of  the  17
th  century,  three  notable  Englishmen: 
William  Ames,  a  Puritan  theologian,  William  Fulbecke,  a  lawyer,  and  Matthew 
Sutcliffe, clergyman, academic and lawyer, excluded religion as a basis for the 
just  war  doctrine.  Francisco  de  Victoria  and  Francisco  Suarez  contributed  to 
further  integrating  the  classic  just  war  doctrine  into  the  overtly  secular  and 
legalist  doctrine  of  the  modern  international  law  of  war.  Thus,  from  the  mid-
seventeenth  century  until  the  mid-twentieth,  the  idea  of  just  war  largely 
disappeared as a conscious source of moral reflection about war and its restraint. 
Hugo Grotius, John Locke, and Emerich deVattel removed the last lingering traces 
of the medieval just war doctrine which led to the modern doctrine entirely based 
in nature  and  agreements among  persons, with  no  backwards glances seeking 
divine approval. 
The central weakness of the medieval classic doctrine was that it  oscillated 
between aggravating cruelties in war, because the victorious Prince as the agent 
of God was punishing the unjust defeated, and a high level of artificiality that left Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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it without an impact upon the content of the jus in bello. In particular, it failed to 
promote the idea that the jus in bello applied regardless of the justness of the 
cause. This idea has in fact been  hindered by the long history of the just war 
doctrine and has taken centuries to become established. The indivisibility of God's 
will was too serious an impediment to the notion that a war might be just for both 
sides engaged in it. 
Civilians (who did not enjoy the advantage of carrying arms) suffered some of 
the  most  appalling  atrocities  of  medieval  warfare  at  the  hands  of  the  military 
(who were the only ones privileged to bear arms). Yet this law of arms yielded 
ideas  not  without  value  for  the  subsequent  development  of  the  modern 
international law of war. First, it contributed the idea of a body of rules governing 
the military class regardless of frontiers or allegiance, and independently of the 
justice or injustice of the initial resort to war. Second, it affirmed the idea that 
only sovereigns could wage war, properly understood. Thus, the medieval legacy 
of the just war did yield something of value to posterity. Mainly under the force of 
Church disapproval, expressed by anathema, it gave no place to private war or 
indiscriminate  incursion,  which  were  the  main  source  of  violence  inflicting 
medieval  society.  To  such  private  wars  the  law  of  arms  gave  no  acceptable 
status. Claims to ransoms and spoils would not be upheld. It made some attempt 
to bring to book professional freebooters whose behavior was synonymous with 
terror, brutality, and looting. The requirement that the war be public and open 
evolved from the Thomist formulation of the just war doctrine, which excluded 
the "private war" of the feudal lord. The Thomist formula insisted that for a war 
to be "just" it had to be "public." 
Once the modern territorial states had been established, their resort to arms 
became open by necessity, and soon no form of fighting could properly be a war 
other  than  that  waged  by  a  sovereign  state.  In  the  second  half  of  the  19th 
century, under the impact of a collection of ideals that might be termed secular 
humanitarianism,  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  were  subjected  to  a  major Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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codifying redaction at the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 
1907.  This  was  the  era  of  positivism,  when  state  sovereignty  enjoyed  utmost 
importance, which meant the virtual expulsion of the just war doctrine from all 
considerations. States might, in accepted international law of the day, resort to 
war as a legitimate instrument of national policy.  
With the gradual decline of that claim, through the progressive stages of the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  Pact  of  Paris,  and  the  United  Nations 
Charter, a new (legal) doctrine of the just and lawful war—limited to individual or 
collective self-defense—and of collective peace enforcement, appeared as the new 
jus ad bellum. Necessarily, the old question reappears: Does the jus in bello bind 
the  aggressor  and  the  self-defender  alike?  Some  would  argue  that  waging  an 
aggressive war is the supreme international criminal act and that those who take 
part in such a war are participants in this criminality and are not entitled to the 
protection of jus in bello. On the other side of the same coin there are those—
most prominently Michael Walzer—who claim that those who are fighting a just 
war ("the good guys") ought not to be held to the demands of jus in bello. Such 
arguments  (moral,  legal,  political,  or  religious,  whatever  they  might  be), 
however,  would  bring  us  back  to  the  evils  of  the  medieval  classic  just  war 
doctrine and all the miseries that accompanied it. The humanitarian law theory 
and  its  associate,  the  human  rights  theory,  reject  discrimination  among 
participants in war whether on the side of the aggressor or of the defender. But, 
Walzer's revivalism of the classic just war doctrine, as we shall see, appears bent 
on bringing back the worst of this medieval doctrine. 
Walzer, Hypocrisy, and Just War Theory 
Michael Walzer finds moral reassurance in hypocrisy. Others would disagree. The 
public spectacle of mutual accusations of hypocrisy by irreconcilable ideological 
opponents, especially when war breaks out, reveal, according to Walzer, shared 
moral knowledge. Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars, begins his revival of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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the medieval, Catholic just war doctrine with the claim that exposure of hypocrisy 
may be "the most important form of moral criticism" (1992: xxix). For “wherever 
we find hypocrisy,” states Walzer, “we also find moral knowledge”
 (1992: 230): 
hypocrites presume "the moral understanding of the rest of us" (1992: 29). 
Uncovering the moral reality of war is to be accomplished, according to Walzer, 
through unmasking the hypocrisy of politicians and generals by putting their 
words to the test of the emerging ethical facts. 
However, as should be well known, Walzer's colleague and friend, Judith 
Shklar, argued compellingly against his claim about the alleged revelatory power 
of hypocrisy to present us with shared moral knowledge and particularly its 
application to the project of constructing a "just war theory". Shklar makes four 
important points: first, she reminds us that charges of hypocrisy quickly bring 
about counter-accusations of the same, and, second, that these imputations do 
not "imply shared knowledge, but mutual inaccessibility" (1984: 81); thirdly, she 
teaches us a lesson that "the very notion of wars as either just or unjust is by no 
means universally accepted among the citizens of liberal democracies" (1984: 79-
80); and fourth, most importantly, she insists that it is wrong (both in the sense 
of "morally impermissible" and an error) "to put hypocrisy first" (in her sense of 
ranking any vice above cruelty) because it "entangles us […] in too much moral 
cruelty, exposes us too easily to misanthropy, and unbalances our politics" 
(1984: 86). There is no evidence that Walzer has neglected all four of these 
lessons, but he most certainly decided to dismiss Shklar's second and third 
insight. Hence, it stands to reason that a just war theory erected on the 
erroneously attributed epistemic status of hypocrisy as revealing alleged moral 
facts ("shared moral knowledge") will exhibit all three of the undesirable 
outcomes Shklar urges caution about: moral cruelty, misanthropy, and 
unbalanced politics.
ii That this is indeed the legacy of Walzer's just war theory 
must be fully argued elsewhere, but I expect at least a glimpse of it to become 
evident even in this article. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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However, before turning to our main concern—the study about the 
fundamental nature of a just war theorist—it is worth exploring the importance of 
the lesson that extreme caution is in order regarding Walzer's revivalism
iii of the 
medieval ideas about "just" war. In its early applications the idea of just war 
served the purpose of justifying the bloody crusades all the way to the 
desecration of Hagia Sophia and the Latin occupation of Constantinople in April 
1204. The looting and devastation of the greatest Christian city of the medieval 
world by other (Western) Christians, precisely when the Byzantium was under 
pressure from Islam, is a reminder of what can happen when one is ideologically 
armed with a just war theory: not much room for compassion regarding even 
your Christian co-religionists appears available, but only "moral cruelty, 
misanthropy, and unbalanced politics". Before the final fall to the Ottomans in 
1453, for almost two centuries Byzantium was forced to consider the option of 
the union of the churches in response to the desperate need for military help 
from the West to combat the Seljuk Turks. But Western spiritual leaders had 
made a precondition of any assistance the reunion of the churches with 
Constantinople subordinated to Rome. This humiliating conditioning of military aid 
with acceptance of papal primacy together with the enduring and vivid memory of 
the "just war" sacrilege of 1204 lead to the Byzantine proverbial saying: "Better 
the Turkish turban than the papal tiara" (Herrin, 2008).
iv  
Walzer's initiative to revive the Catholic medieval just war doctrine three 
quarters into the 20
th century may appear additionally peculiar as it skips 
backwards over the singularly important historical contributions of the 
Enlightenment, and neglects the greatest results in the history of moral 
philosophy in general and on the question of morality of war in particular by the 
most important Enlightenment thinker, Immanuel Kant, who so brilliantly 
systematized the ideas of freedom and rationality. And as Walzer's colleague, 
Judith Shklar, again reminds us, Kant sees war as beyond the rules of good and 
evil; hence not a practice that can be just or unjust.
v It belongs to the domain of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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necessity, and the only imperative regarding war is to end it as soon as possible. 
Kantians cannot approve of the travail by the just war theorist as they view him 
as "encouraging people to enter upon wars recklessly and then baptizing his own 
side with the holy water of justice. Every enemy can easily be made to look the 
aggressor" (Shklar, 1984: 80).
vi  
It must be made clear that Kant is neither a radical pacifist nor a 
Schmittian realist. His point—so well rendered by Shklar—is that no (moral) rules 
are possible that would confer moral-theoretic imprimatur on some wars 
characterized by specific attributes. Any violent conflict could be claimed to 
satisfy such descriptions whether it did or not. Hence, the entire project should be 
rejected. Kant is opposed to the idea of constructing "theories" that would render 
specific wars "just" or "unjust," for an endeavor of this sort could easily be used 
to rhetorically turn even an obvious aggression into a "good war". The fate of 
Yugoslavia in 1999 arguably involves precisely such an example where an 
aggression, by nineteen most powerful countries against a small state that 
attacked none of them, through capricious manipulation of just war "rules," 
became baptized a just war. Walzer was chief among many Western publicists 
who first urged then cheered the aggression, but was practically unique in also 
demanding a ground offensive.  
Yet another reason exists that makes the timing and nature of Walzer's 
revival of just war theory curious. It occurs in the period of unprecedented 
progress in international law where, regarding jus ad bellum, aggression is 
marked as the supreme crime per Nuremberg precedent and embedded as such 
in the U.N. Charter, while a number of elements introduced in the positive 
international law regulate jus in bello, such as the Nuremberg Principles or the 
four Geneva Conventions, etc. But Walzer has no respect for this paper world of 
international lawyers, and instead opts for yet another medieval Catholic 
invention: the casuistic method in determining what is just and unjust with 
respect to war or what the rules of war should be.
vii Of course, this opens up the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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unpleasant possibility that the legal and just war theoretical (presumably moral) 
judgments about an instance of war come in the opposition to each other. What 
to do about a war that is deemed "illegal but good"?
viii A powerful state, bent on 
waging war, could in such a case want to emphasize the latter and ignore the 
former verdict. Such a gift from just war theory to raw power! This was exactly 
the case with the US-led NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999. 
 
Scholarship vs. Activism 
Let us now consider directly the question: What is a just war theorist? War is a 
very serious and grave matter.  Yet discourse about (just and unjust) war is not 
always as serious as is warranted.  “Serious” normative judgment in this context 
requires keeping in clear view the interdisciplinary matrix of values. In the moral 
order, the phrase “unjust war” attaches a particularly powerful stigma of wrongful 
action on the part of the accused alleged perpetrators; in the political order, the 
use of this phrase is a call to action; and in the legal order its meaning is defined 
in the existing documents of positive international law via the conceptually linked 
term "aggression," and the (legal) rules about the conduct in war. Given that the 
discourse about war may equally occur within moral, political, and legal domains, 
the minimum of seriousness while engaging in the war-discourse requires a 
precise and explicit “indexing” to the specific normative order of usage. 
Elsewhere
 (Jokic, 2009) I have shown that Walzer does not meet this 
minimum of seriousness required of proper scholarship: 
 
Despite [the] relevance of morality for the other two normative orders 
[legal and political], it is very important to keep the three separate at all 
times. In fact, the effort to avoid conflation of these normative orders is a 
mark of serious and responsible scholarship, or discourse about normative 
matters in general. All too often normative discussions fail to satisfy this Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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basic requirement. Such is the case with Michael Walzer's recent 
discussion on proportionality (Walzer, 2009). 
Already in his first paragraph, Walzer confuses the moral and legal 
orders and perhaps the political as well. Right after claiming that 
"disproportionate" is the favorite critical term of the partakers in the 
discussions on the morality of war, Walzer accuses those same 
(unidentified) people of not knowing what this term means in international 
law. Is Walzer claiming that before one can formulate a moral judgment 
using the term "disproportionate" one must ensure that it is used in the 
same sense as in international law? Could not a practice be 
disproportionate in a way that it might justify a moral judgment that the 
practice in question is wrong without thereby amounting to a legal claim 
that the practice is forbidden by international law? Contrary to Walzer's 
apparent claim, this seems quite possible. To make things worse, Walzer 
slams yet another accusation at his targets claiming that "they don't 
realize that ["disproportionate"] has been used far more often to justify 
than to criticize what we might think of as excessive violence." What might 
Walzer mean here by talking of those who use "disproportionate" to 
"justify" excessive violence? Is the justification he has in mind moral, 
legal, or simply political? I am afraid that the only meaning that can be 
attached to "justify" in this context is political—as what appears to be the 
subject of justification is a certain policy regarding use of excessive 
violence—thus completing Walzer's mess of conflating all three normative 
orders in just the first three sentences. 
 
Returning to our discussion, it is particularly worrisome when the legal and 
political uses of the word "war" are bifurcated, as we have seen with the example 
of the phrase "illegal but good". War-discourse is replete with conceptual “mix 
ups” and bifurcations of this nature which can, and often do, result in serious Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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harms to those who find themselves on the receiving end of inappropriate uses of 
this discourse. A significant part of contemporary war-discourse rarely meets 
even the basic standard for the minimum of seriousness, which suggests that the 
magnitude of abuse that it may generate is potentially significant. A general 
deficit of seriousness, in the above technical sense, suggests a practice that may 
not be entirely compatible with any scholarly work, as the latter always requires a 
methodology that rules out (ideologically driven) arbitrariness and randomness to 
the maximum possible degree. 
With this (discursive) context in mind, and specifically the dangers it is 
fraught with, a "just war theorist" would, broadly speaking, be a kind of scholar 
or expert. By invoking the ideas of scholarship or expertise I mean to account for 
the meaning of "theorist" in the phrase "just war theorist". When we look up the 
world “scholar” in an English dictionary we find that it refers to a learned person 
who has a great deal of knowledge, especially an academic, someone who is a 
specialist in a given branch of knowledge. So, for example, a “just war scholar” 
would, then, be a learned person whose branch of knowledge is (just and unjust) 
war. To be more precise, we would not consider war a “branch of knowledge,” 
rather scholars from a number of branches of knowledge might choose to focus 
on war as their subject: international lawyers, political scientists, or philosophers, 
for example. A scholar from any of those branches of knowledge (or other 
disciplines) who decides to “specialize” in war might then qualify as a “just war 
scholar.” However, there is another phrase that is sometimes utilized that 
indicates a somewhat relaxed usage; it is (just war) "expert.”  
When we look up the word “expert” in a dictionary we find that it refers to 
a person with a high degree of knowledge of a certain subject. So, a “just war 
expert” would be someone with a high degree of knowledge about the subject of 
just and unjust war (not necessarily an academic or someone trained in moral 
philosophy). When we think about the subject of war, the label “just war expert” 
reveals an unintended yet suggestive ambiguity. It could mean (i) someone Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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particularly skilled in perpetrating a just or an unjust war in various ways that 
this can be done, or (ii) someone (presumed) particularly skilled in determining 
which historical episodes of violence, including in particular the current events, 
constitute just or unjust wars. Let us call the skills described in (i) “war-
engineering skills” and people who have them “war-engineers,” while the skills 
described in (ii) might be called “just war-pronouncing skills” and the people who 
have them “just war-pronouncement-makers” or "just war judges". It goes 
without saying that in the current discourse on war everyone partaking in it, qua 
"expert," wants to count as expert of the latter sort, and not many would want to 
be notorious as experts of the former kind (certainly not as engineers of unjust 
wars as that is tantamount to being a war criminal). Everyone would rather be a 
pronouncement-maker than an engineer in this respect. It is not difficult to see, 
however, that a good case can be made for maintaining that many partakers in 
the current just war discourse generate nearly as much harm as if they were in 
fact war-engineers. This would have to be argued in greater detail elsewhere 
though the already invoked example of the "humanitarian intervention" against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 may be sufficient to clearly show it. 
The dominant desire of just war discourse partakers to be just war 
pronouncement makers, or just war judges, is nicely explained by the shift in 
terminology from “scholar” to “expert” in this area. It is characteristic of the 
current Western discourse that many who are not associated with any institution 
of higher learning or research (or those who are, might be untutored in moral 
philosophy) still want to be in the position to authoritatively pronounce on these 
matters. Often this is done as a call to action (one that inevitably involves 
dropping bombs on countries with unwanted regimes). The non-scholarly experts 
who desire to authoritatively pronounce on the occurrence of events that would 
make war just include journalists, NGO operatives, think-tankers, or even 
government officials serving on various presidential task forces or are intelligence 
operatives. The danger hidden in this idiosyncratic practice of social epistemology Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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is clear: once pronouncements about just war are made, by “experts,” they 
become virtually irreversible since credibility in the political sphere usually 
depends precisely on firm positions and opinions, viz., the refusal to revise calls 
one has made or reverse oneself. Of course, these characteristics are virtually 
contrary to the epistemological virtues associated with real experts, i.e., proper 
scholarship. This makes the already weakened methodological rigor embedded in 
the very nature of the just war theory, as we have seen, relaxed even further, to 
the point that what passes for "scholarship" in this domain resembles more 
closely ideology, advocacy, and lobbying than anything approaching science or 
philosophy.  
The question about the occurrence of a just (or unjust) war is a question 
about the existence of facts that can in principle be discovered and identified 
(assuming one would—in a non-Kantian spirit—even want to engage in 
"practicing" just war theory). A war does not become just (or unjust) as a result 
of a pronouncement by persons (somehow) vested with the authority to do so. An 
occurrence of just war is not something governed by institutional rules as is the 
case with, for example, marriage: the right person under the right circumstances, 
where “right” in both cases is institutionally defined, can create a new 
institutional fact by simply uttering something, say, “(by the powers vested in 
me) I pronounce you legally married.” It results from the discovery of the 
relevant evidence left in “nature” and our records of it rather than institutional 
procedures and political decisions. One who would want to claim such 
"institutional power" for oneself to make pronouncements on the justness or 
unjustness of wars, no matter what his actual expertise may be, is not a true 
scholar, but an activist (or lobbyist) engaged in promoting, advancing, or 
recommending policies having to do with war. However, activism on this matter 
must clearly be delineated from any kind of scholarship as in this context it in fact 
brings about the third degree of separation from scholarly inquiry, and how 
vividly this brings out the Kantian concern so well formulated, as we have already Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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seen, by Walzer's colleague, Judith Shklar: "encouraging people to enter upon 
wars recklessly and then baptizing his own side with the holy water of justice. 
Every enemy can easily be made to look the aggressor". Hence, this sort of 
activism is thrice removed from any kind of scholarship; instead it is only 
parasitizing on a notion of sound inquiry (as it exists in science or philosophy), 
which gives the activist the aura of undeserved importance. 
It is worth summarizing the three degrees of separation between the 
practices identified above and anything that could properly be considered 
scholarship or rational inquiry (in particular philosophy). The first degree of 
separation is the mentioned general failure to consistently index "just war" 
judgments to appropriate normative orders (moral, legal or political); the second 
is associated with the practice of allegedly authoritative (non-scholarly yet 
expert) pronouncement making or judging of wars as just or unjust; and the third 
is activism in the form of advocating for and promoting certain wars (usually 
those your side is undertaking, planning, or contemplating). Consequently, in 
light of these considerations, the phrase "activist scholar" is an oxymoron. Yet, 
"activist-scholar" is the term used for example by Amnesty International to 
describe William Schabas and other panelists at its 2002 Annual Assembly.
ix That 
this is an incongruous proposition can be shown in two ways. First, activism and 
scholarship are incompatible activities that cannot simultaneously characterize 
what one does. To give an analogous example, one cannot be a racecar driver 
and airplane traveler; although, of course, a racecar driver can travel by plane 
(say to the site of his next competition) he cannot be racing cars while traveling 
by plane. Similarly, activism effectively suppresses proper scholarship and at best 
puts it in the subservient position. Secondly, activism and scholarship don't 
combine very well because the former quickly consumes the latter the way fire 
consumes flammable materials such as paper; hence just as paper and fire 
cannot be in the same place for very long, activism tends to consume scholarship 
just as comprehensively. This consuming of the other relationship can go further Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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than activism overwhelming scholarship as in the case of an intelligence operative 
who takes as cover the role of an activist; in that case, activism is consumed by 
the intelligence operation. Hence, proper scholarship must be conducted 
independently of any activism or intelligence scheme. The just war theorists are 
clearly not well positioned in this regard. 
Finally, one may even wonder what should be the proper characterization 
of a just war theorist and activist, whose pronouncements of justness are applied 
to wars of aggression (i.e., when he baptizes an aggression his country is 
engaged in as just)? Would this be a criminal act of incitement to international 
violence, an act of aiding and abetting aggression—the supreme crime in 
international law? Would this make a just war theorist into a war criminal? 
The Dangers of Public Just War Theory 
Normative judgments, be they moral, legal or political, are as good as the facts 
that support them. Activists can easily be wrong in this regard (no matter the 
alleged degree of their expertise in presumably relevant fields of knowledge). Bad 
facts can only lead to bad normative statements, which depending on the context 
can bring about dire consequences for the innocents. Activism with such 
consequences, of course, cannot be condoned! It leads to the effects Shklar has 
poignantly warned us about: moral cruelty, misanthropy, and unbalanced politics. 
It would be useful to see this on an example.  
The case I want to consider will contrast the normative results of the 
globally unreliable "Report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990" (ICI), published in 1993, 
which gave rise to the allegations against Léon Mugesera, and the exhaustive, 
meticulous, and rigorous analysis in the September 8, 2003 judgment of 
Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.A.).
x  
On November 22, 1992, at Kabaya, Rwanda, Léon Mugesera made a 
speech (in the Kinyarwanda language) at a partisan political meeting in the 
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brought the news out of Africa about the speech and provided its authoritative 
("expert") interpretation. The striking conclusions drawn by the ICI without 
questioning the persons involved were that Mugesera's speech constituted an 
incitement to commit murder, hatred, and genocide. The ICI report had a 
substantial impact in the media and among other NGOs, and its carefully selected 
passages from the Mugesera speech crystallized quickly into the unshakable 
construal according to which the speech "incited the people of Kabaya to kill all 
Tutsi Rwandans and throw them in the Nyabarongo River so they can go back to 
their country of origin, Ethiopia." This all sounds very bad! Indeed, since the 
Mugeseras had made Canada their home in 1993, the ICI report's conclusions 
regarding Mugesera prompted in 1995 the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration to initiate deportation procedures because the speech constituted an 
incitement to commit murder, an offence against the Criminal Code of Canada; 
this made him an inadmissible person according to the Immigration Act. 
More specifically, the information publicized in the ICI report led the 
Minister to make the following allegations of law which, in his opinion, justified 
the deportation of Léon Mugesera (and his family, a wife and five children): (A) 
The speech made on November 22, 1992 constituted an incitement to commit 
murder; (B) by inciting "MRND members and Hutus to kill Tutsis" and inciting 
them "to hatred against the Tutsis," the said speech constituted an incitement to 
genocide and an incitement to hatred; and (C) the said speech constituted a 
crime against humanity.
xi These are very serious allegations indeed, and the court 
had to deal with both the questions of fact—explanation and analysis of the 
speech—and a question of law—whether the speech is a crime, once the speech is 
understood and analyzed. With some simplification, it is fair to say that since the 
case against Mugesera was based on the ICI report, which made the speech a 
high-profile subject of controversy, it would stand or fall with its credibility 
regarding the claims about the speech. And the court found that "the ICI report, 
at least in its conclusions regarding Mr. Mugesera, is absolutely not reliable."
xii Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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Since this case would not have existed in the first place without the ICI, which 
was in the end rejected as unreliable on more than compelling grounds, it is of 
interest to us, which is the whole point of the example, to see how the experts 
who are also activists fared in court. It is instructive in this regard to quote the 
judgment in extenso: 
The Minister's decision to seek deportation and the decisions of the 
adjudicator, Appeal Division and the Trial Division Judge were all decisively 
influenced by the ICI report. ICI co-chairperson Alison Des Forges, called 
by the Minister as an expert witness, admitted that the Commission's 
report was produced "very quickly, under very great pressure". She also 
acknowledged that, as a human rights activist, she could not claim 
objectivity although attempting to maintain neutrality as between political 
factions. She even admitted that some of her accusations "will inevitably 
[be] shown to be false". She finally conceded that the speech might be 
regarded by some as "legitimate self-defence". She also admitted that no 
witness interviewed by the ICI had been present when the speech was 
made. Another admission was that, from the evidence she had been able 
to obtain, the only impact of Mugesera's speech had been vandalism and 
theft. She declined to identify the person who had provided the ICI with 
the transcript from which the translation used by ICI was prepared. When 
cross-examined as to whether she took out of context passages in the 
speech which suited her, Ms. Des Forges admitted having done so. She 
admitted having selected that evidence which supported the conclusions 
reached by the Commission. Finally, she could not deny having said to a 
reporter for a newspaper, The Gazette, "Throw him out on his ear . . . 
what are you waiting for?" It was on a deliberately truncated text of 
Mugesera's speech that the ICI concluded him to be a member of the 
death squads. It could only be concluded that Ms. Des Forges testified as Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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an activist with a clear bias against Mugesera and an implacable 
determination to have his head.
xiii 
 
An "expert" witness who admits in court that she cannot be objective due 
to her activism illustrates very well the degrees of separation between experts 
and activists on the one hand and scholars on the other. Hanging on to one's 
activism in court also shows an astonishing confusion about one's role as a court 
expert that it perhaps raises to the level of contempt of court.
xiv The by now 
recognizable but deplorable formulaic invocation that human rights trump law,
xv 
and one's self-important alleged devotion to ending violence and impunity in a 
foreign land leave bitter taste. For, if you the reader put yourself for a moment in 
the shoos of a black citizen of some African country, would you really want some 
white human rights warrior fighting for you at the expense of "having a head" of 
a highly educated black man, your compatriot, based on frivolous and self-serving 
pretexts? No wonder the judge saw her testimony as completely opposite of 
"sober, calm, and non-partisan" and added: 
 
Even making the debatable assumption that a member of a commission of 
inquiry, who is actually its co-chairperson and co-author of the report, can 
be described as an objective witness concerning the conclusions of that 
report, Ms. Des Forges testified much more as an activist than as a 
historian. Her attitude throughout her testimony disclosed a clear bias 
against Mr. Mugesera and an implacable determination to defend the 
conclusions arrived at by the ICI and to have Mr. Mugesera's head.
xvi 
 
The misguided activism
xvii exhibited by Des Forges in the case of one man (and 
his family) would get hugely multiplied in its bad consequences if adopted by just 
war theorists calling for ("just") aggressions, surgical strikes, smart bombs, or Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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ground offensives the way, for example, Michael Walzer did in case of the 1999 
aggression against Yugoslavia.  
 
Decriminalizing U.S. War Crimes 
 
The pronouncements by the just war theorists do not end with baptizing decisions 
to go to war by his own side with the holy water of justice. They also pronounce 
on conduct in war. Here too Walzer took the lead.  
On November 8-10, 2010 a conference titled "The Enduring Legacy of Just 
and Unjust Wars—35 Year Later" was held at the New York University celebrating 
the 35
th anniversary of this book's publication.
xviii The conference attendance was 
by invitation only. What these enthusiasts and aficionados of Walzer's just war 
theory apparently heard from him on this occasion is the following: “If it is not 
possible to win just wars fighting justly, then we will have to revise the jus in 
bello.”
xix Who is the "we" that Walzer talks about here? Presumably it is the same 
"we"
xx as in the book being celebrated at this conference: the “we” is composed 
of people who share a moral understanding of concepts as they relate to war. The 
"we" thus pertains primarily to his compatriots, it seems. And this is even clearer 
when we look at the full quote: 
 
The worry is that if you fight in accordance with the legal regimes of 
international law, you can’t win. That is a major challenge, and I was very 
happy that General [Charles] Dunlap denies that and say you can. Still, it 
is a worry. It must be possible for the good guys to win within the rules, at 
least as a possibility, but also as a real possibility. That’s where ad bellum 
and in bello come together: to win a just war fighting justly. 
But suppose it isn’t possible. That’s what moral philosophers partly 
do—worry. What follows if it is not possible, or not a real possibility? What 
then? Well, the rules would have to be changed. We would have to 
reconsider the content of the rules jus in bello if we could not live within Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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jus in bello and still have the just side win on the battlefield (Anderson, 
2010). 
 
This allows for the second shoe of the just war theory to drop: having already 
baptized his own side with the holy water of justice when considering jus ad 
bellum, thus effectively decriminalizing aggressions by the United States, Walzer 
now gives his side another gift—the decriminalization of war crimes committed by 
American troops and their allies during the US wars of aggression. If with regard 
to the decriminalization of aggression we wondered whether this might be a 
criminal act of incitement to international violence, an act of aiding and abetting 
aggression, the supreme crime in international law, then we must now wonder 
whether this (announced ex post facto) "revision of jus in bello" in fact amounts 
to incitement to commit war crimes by the troops of one's country. Isn't the 
message to American troops, who are continuously engaged in wars in different 
places on the globe, that they need not be concerned about "fighting justly" 
since, if necessary, in bello rules will be revised to fit what they do and find 
convenient in order to win? The rules will be tweaked to fit the American conduct 
in war rather than the other way around!  
Consequently, whether we see just war theorists as some sort of scholars 
or simply as activists in the end their contributions seem to teeter dangerously 
towards that of being just war criminals, both on the count of aiding and abetting 
aggression and on the count of inciting troops to commit war crimes. 
 
References 
 
Africa Watch/New York and Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme 
(FIDH)/Paris. 1993. "Commission Internationale d'Enquête sur les Violations de 
Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda depuis le 1er octobre 1990 (7-21 janvier 1993). 
Rapport final." 
 
Amnesty International USA. 2002. "Reframing Globalization: The Challenge for 
Human Rights." Available at: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/events/agm/agm2002/panels.html (accessed 
January 9, 2011). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
July, 2012, Vol. 4(2):91-114    A. Jokic 
111 
 
 
Anderson, Kenneth. 2010. "Where Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum Come Together,  
  or, ‘This Time of Damned Algebra’."  
http://volokh.com/2010/11/10/where-jus-in-bello-and-jus-ad-bellum-
come-together/. 
 
Casese, Antonio. 1999. "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards  
  International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in  
  the World Community?" European Journal of International Law 10: 23-30. 
 
Dickson, Tiphaine. 2010 "Under An Empty Sky: Ethics and Law in Morgenthau  
  and Walzer." (Unpublished manuscript). 
 
Doyle, Michael. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." Philosophy  
  and Public Affairs 12: 205-235. 
 
Havel, Vaclav. 1999. "Kosovo and the End of Nation-State." New York Review of  
  Books, 10 June: 6. 
 
Herrin, Judith. 2008. Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire.  
  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Jokic, Aleksandar. 2009. " Michael Walzer's Sense Of Proportionality 
Another Casualty In Israel's Offensive Against Gaza?" Swans January 26, 
2009 available at: http://www.swans.com/library/art15/ajokic05.html (last 
accessed on October 17, 2011). 
 
Jokic Aleksandar and Milan Brdar. Unjust Honoris Causa: Chronicle of a Most  
  Peculiar Academic Dishonor Kragujevac-Belgrade: Freedom activity  
  Centre, 2011. 
 
Orend, Brian. 2000. War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective  
  Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 
 
Orend, Brian. 1999. "Kant's Just War Theory." Journal of the History of  
  Philosophy, 37: 323-53. 
 
Shklar, N. Judith. 1984. Ordinary Vices. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
 
Shklar, N. Judith. 1998. "The Work of Michael Walzer." In Stanley Hoffman, ed.  
  Political Thought and Political Thinkers. Chicago: University of Chicago  
  Press. 
 
The Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.A.). 2003.  
Available online at: 
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2003/2003fca325/2003fca325.html  
(Accessed last on December 9, 2010). 
 
Walzer, Michael. 2009. "On Proportionality: How Much is Too Much in War?" The  
New Republic January 8 (accessed online on December 9, 2010: 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/proportionality). 
 
Walzer, Michael. 1992. Just and Unjust Wars (2nd ed.). New York: Basic Books. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
July, 2012, Vol. 4(2):91-114    A. Jokic 
112 
 
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i A recent work answers precisely these questions, however. The book by 
Aleksandar Jokic and Milan Brdar (2011) offers a detailed account and analysis of 
the academic scandal regarding the honorary doctorate awarded to Professor 
Michael Walzer by Belgrade University and the events that followed.  
iiFor these insights by Shklar and criticism of Walzer I must thank Tiphaine 
Dickson (2010), where she argues against the conventional view that Hans 
Morgenthau eschews morality in his construction of a realist theory while Michael 
Walzer is reclaiming moral argument for political theory, as placing things exactly 
on the head. 
iii As with most "isms" this one too is intended to suggest that there is something 
wrong with the project. 
iv See particularly chapter 27. 
v Curiously, some authors characterize this view of Kant's, that no just war is 
possible, as "the traditional reading" and contend that Kant has a just war theory. 
See, for example, (Orend, 1999), who claims that that there are "three basic 
perspectives on the ethics of war and piece with realism and pacifism at the 
extremes and just war theory in the middle" and since he rules out that Kant can 
be seen as either realist (based on a comically crude rendition of the international 
relations realism) or pacifist Kant is said to be a just war theorist. This is not the 
place to argue this, but I strongly reject both the claim that Kant is a just war 
theorist and that there is anything Kantian in the newly developed so-called 
"contemporary Kantian just war theory". See (Orend, 2000). Similar misuse of 
Kant occurs in the contemporary "democratic peace theory" by authors such as 
Michael Doyle who assert that Kant would condone the spreading of democracy 
by military means. See (Doyle, 1983). It is well known that Kant was not a good 
friend of democracy, but even if he were the idea of this post-Cold War doctrine, 
so comforting for the US hegemonic inclinations, is another distortion of his 
philosophical thought. 
vi In my judgment this statement by Shklar has to be the most brilliant thing ever 
said about the character and telos of a just war theorist. Hopefully, the rest of 
this essay will provide further support for this insight. 
vii Walzer's method in his own words is one of practical casuistry: "we look to the 
lawyers for general formulas, but to historical and actual debates for those 
particular judgments that both reflect the war convention and constitute its vital 
force. I don't mean to suggest that our judgments, even over time, have 
unambiguous collective form. Nor, however, are they idiosyncratic and private in 
character. They are socially patterned, and the patterning is religious, cultural, 
and political, as well as legal. The task of the moral theorist is to study the 
pattern as a whole, reaching for its deepest reasons." (Walzer, 1992, p. 45). 
This is, no doubt, an idiosyncratic conception of the proper role of the 
moral theorist, one that is not in line with the usual understanding found in moral 
philosophy. But Walzer is untutored in philosophy, and according to his own 
testimony has no interest in "managing real philosophy." Hence, Walzer's 
conception of the task of the moral theorist as one engaged in "practical 
casuistry" involves a very different sort of thing, whatever it might be in its own 
right, than the familiar kind of work we find actual moral philosophers practicing, 
which crucially involves the use of thought experiments. Walzer explicitly rejects 
the latter: "I don't think that I ever managed real philosophy. I couldn't breathe 
easily at the high level of abstraction that philosophy seemed to require, where 
my friends in the group were entirely comfortable. And I quickly got impatient 
with the playful extension of hypothetical cases, moving farther and farther away 
from the world we all lived in." (From an interview available at: 
http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.com/2003_08_01archive.html, last accessed 
September 20, 2011.) Consequently, the methodology, a kind of "practical Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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casuistry," chosen by Walzer to study the rules of war cannot be considered to 
belong to an endeavour of moral philosophy.  
 
viii Examples of pronouncements about the goodness of NATO aggression against 
Yugoslavia despite its illegality are not difficult to find among public figures 
(politicians) and scholars turned publicists. Here is Vaclav Havel:  
 
This war places human rights above the rights of the state. The Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was attacked by the alliance without a direct 
mandate from the UN. This did not happen irresponsibly, as an act of 
aggression or out of disrespect for international law. It happened, on the 
contrary, out of respect of the law, for the law that ranks higher than the 
law which protects the sovereignty of states. The alliance has acted out of 
respect for human rights. (Havel, 1999: 6). 
 
Hence, when a supreme crime in international law—aggression—is committed, of 
course without a mandate from the UN, that can still be a good thing, because 
some presumed "higher ranking" (moral) law will somehow obviate the illegality 
in question. Conveniently, "morality" trumps law, in the view of this politician. But 
also scholars exist who are capable of asserting the same. A good example is 
Antonio Casese who evaluates NATO's 1999 aggression against Yugoslavia as 
"illegal under international law" but in his "ethical viewpoint resort to armed force 
was justified" (Casese, 1999: 23). Thus, the vocabulary of "illegal but good" 
enters narratives about international relations with the serious consequence of 
effectively decriminalizing aggression of powerful states against the week ones. 
This could not have been achieved without Walzer's revivalism of medieval just 
war theory. 
ix Amnesty International USA, "Reframing Globalization: The Challenge for Human 
Rights,: available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/events/agm/agm2002/panels.html (accessed 
January 9, 2011). For Amnesty International Schabas is an "activist-scholar" with 
respect to events in Rwanda as he was a member of the International 
Commission of Inquiry that produced a notorious report (see example below) on 
the situation in Rwanda. More on the exploits and the report by this Commission 
bellow. 
x The report was published (apparently) only in French on March 8, 1993 by Africa 
Watch/New York and Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme 
(FIDH)/Paris. The original title: "Commission Internationale d'Enquête sur les 
Violations de Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda depuis le 1er octobre 1990 (7-21 
janvier 1993). Rapport final". Hereafter cited as "ICI". The report was financed 
mostly by an NGO, Africa Watch (later renamed Human Rights Watch) and 
compiled by legal experts (William Schabas, Eric Gillet, René Degni-Ségui, et al.) 
and human rights activists (Jean Carbonare, Alison Des Forges, Philippe 
Dahinden, et al.). The Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) (F.C.A.) is available online at 
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2003/2003fca325/2003fca325.html (accessed last on 
December 9, 2010). I urge careful reading of this document. 
xi Based on a more detailed summary in The Mugesera v. Canada (my emphasis). 
xii See paragraph 117. 
xiii My emphasis. 
xiv It is quite amazing that instead of being held in contempt of court this "expert" 
returned on many occasions to act as a key witness in many cases at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) laying out the history of that 
country and similarly wanting the heads of many more accused there. 
xv We have already seen how Havel played it; see note 8. 
xvi See paragraph 102. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    What’s a Just War Theorist 
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xvii This finding is in no way challenged by the fact that the judgment by the 
Canadian Federal Court of Appeals was reversed by the Canadian Supreme Court 
(Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 
100, 2005 SCC 40). Des Forges’ testimony was not directly considered by the 
Supreme Court, which found that the Federal Court of Appeals had exceeded its 
jurisdiction by reconsidering evidence tendered in earlier immigration 
proceedings. Nonetheless, its final decision in this case is an unfortunate example 
of the corruptive influence of international politics on the quality of domestic legal 
work. 
xviii The pamphlet announcing the conference is available at: 
http://www.nyutikvah.org/events/docs/Walzer%20Conference.pdf. Accessed 
January 11, 2011. 
xix We don't have as yet these words directly from Walzer, but I quote him here 
as reported by one proud conference attendee, Kenneth Anderson, at: 
http://volokh.com/2010/11/10/where-jus-in-bello-and-jus-ad-bellum-come-
together/. Accessed on January 11, 2011. 
xx Referred to by Judith Shklar as “we,’ [Walzer’s] favourite characters” (Shklar, 
1998: 379). 